South Carolina Law Review
Volume 7

Issue 1

Article 25

Fall 1954

Torts
W. Hummel Harley
A. Arthur Rosenblum

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Harley, W. Hummel and Rosenblum, A. Arthur (1954) "Torts," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 7 : Iss. 1 ,
Article 25.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol7/iss1/25

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Harley and Rosenblum: Torts

TORTS
W. HUmmEL, HARLEY* AND A. ARTHUR ROSENBLUM*:
The decisions which are herein reviewed fit into two main
categories, those involving negligence and those which deal
with damages. A few other cases are considered under a miscellaneous heading.
While some of the cases under the negligence section could
be dealt with under Agency, and those under the damages
section could be taken up under a review of their own, it was
felt that these cases involved the law of torts to the extent
that they should be considered here.

I
Miscellaneous Decisions
Liability of Hospitals-The Court had occasion in Sloan v.
Edgewood Sanatorium,' to consider the liability of a private
hospital to a mental patient who committed suicide. After
citing with approval an article in the Notre Dame Lawyer2
in which the test of "foreseeability" was laid down, the Court
adopted the majority view that the establishment of the
standard of care did not require expert testimony.
Liability of Construction Company - Where suit was
brought by a motorist for personal injuries and property damage sustained in an automobile collision against the driver of
the other automobile involved and against the construction
company building the highway although it had completed
its job, and there had been no formal acceptance by the highway department, the Court held in Nichols v. Craven3 that no
formal acceptance is necessary and the liability of the contractor will cease with a practical acceptance after completion
of the work.
*LL.B., University of South Carolina, 1938. Member of American,
South Carolina and Laurens County Bar Associations.
**LL.B., University of South Carolina, 1951. Member of South Carolina and Laurens County Bar Associations.
1. 225 S.C. 1, 80 S.E. 2d 348 (1954).
2. Note, HOSpITAL LALMITY FOR NON-ATTENDANCE PATIENT, XXVI
NoTR DAME LAWYER, 314 (1951).

3. 224 S.C. 244, 78 S.E. 2d 376 (1953).
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Libel and Slander-In Anderson v. Southern Railway,4 the
Court reiterated the principle announced in True v. Southern
Railway5 that publication at a meeting, required by agreement
of the parties, in the absence of malice is privileged.
II
Negligence
The inevitable question to be answered in the automobile collision case where a third party was the driver is that of joint
enterprise, master and servant, or principal and agent. All of
these questions involving imputed negligence were before the
Court during the period under review.
In Thompson v. S. C. Highway Dept.,6 it was held that if
the negligent driver was the agent or servant of the passenger,
or they were engaged in a joint enterprise, the passenger
could not recover against the highway department for injuries
sustained when the vehicle struck a hole in the street. However in McJunkin v. Waldrep,7 adopting the majority rule,
the Court held that the doctrine of joint enterprise whereby
the negligence of one member of the enterprise is imputable to
others, resting as it does upon the relationship of agency of
one for the other, does not apply in actions between members
of the joint enterprise and does not therefore prevent one
member of the enterprise from holding another liable for
personal injuries inflicted by the latter's negligence in the
prosecution of the enterprise.
In Gillespie v. Fords where a husband brought action against
an insurance agent and his company for damage to husband's automobile and loss of consortium arising out of a
collision between husband's automobile, driven by the wife,
and the agent's automobile, the Court held that a non-suit
was error in that there was evidence sufficient to go to the
jury on the question of the wife's contributory negligence,
although in an earlier case by the wife against the same defendants arising out of the same accident, the Court had held
that the wife was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.9 The testimony as given by the wife in the present
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

224 S.C. 65, 77 S.E. 2d 350 (1953).
159 S.C. 454, 157 S.E. 618 (1931).
224 S.C. 338, 79 S.E. 2d 160 (1953).
81 S.E. 2d 284 (S.C. 1954).
81 S.E. 2d 44 (S.C. 1954).
Gillespie v. Ford, 222 S.C. 46, 71 S.E. 2d 596 (1952).
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trial was to be considered, even though she changed it from
that given in the earlier case. The fact that the wife did
change her testimony was relevant only to the credibility of
the witness and did not relieve the trial judge of the duty to
submit the issue to the jury. That the negligence of the wife
is here imputable to the husband, is mentioned only in the
dissent by Chief Justice Baker.
Violation of Statute- Negligence per se - In the case of
Myers v. Evans 0 where a pedestrian, who attempted to cross
a two lane highway at a place other than at the crosswalk,
was hit by a truck, the Court held that this act in violation
of the statutory law was not negligence in this instance as the
truck was headed in the wrong direction and therefore forfeited its statutory preferential status. The Court further
pointed out that it is not the law of this State that a violation
of a statute regulating the operation of a motor vehicle creates
a rebuttable presumption that such violation is a proximate
cause of the injury.
In the two cases decided by the Court involving the Pure
Food and Drug Act," Peters v. Double Cola Bottling Co. of
Columbia,12 and Tedder v. Coca-ColaBottling Co. of Darlington,13 it was held that a violation of the act was negligence
per se. And once a violation is shown, a prima facie case is
made out. Thereafter, a defendant may adduce evidence to
show that there has been, in fact, no negligence.
Res ipsa loquitur - In Barnwell v. Elliott,14 the Court reaffirmed its long standing position that the doctrine of Res
ipsa loquitur does not apply in this State. It went further to
state that this does not mean negligence may not be established
by circumstantial evidence. It is interesting to note that Chief
Justice Baker, in his dissenting opinion, accuses the majority
of circumventing the law in holding that there was some circumstantial evidence from which the jury could infer negligence in the case at hand. He expresses the opinion that it
would be better to overrule the prior decisions and adopt the
rule rather than to circumvent it.15
10. 81 S.E. 2d 32 (S.C. 1954).
11. CoDE

12.
13.
14.
15.

224
224
225
See

OF LAWs OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 32-1451 et seq.
S.C. 437, 79 S.E. 2d 710 (1954).
S.C. 46, 77 S.E. 2d 293 (1953).
S.C. 62, 80 S.E. 2d 748 (1954).
Joseph v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 224 S.C. 105, 77 S.E. 2d 583

(1953), where Chief Justice Baker shows how the plaintiff used an
alleged oral warranty to circumvent the doctrine.
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Guest Statute-The Court reaffirmed a long line of decisions
17
involving the Guest Statute 16 in the case of Bailey v. Seymore
wherein it was stated that the driver must be guilty of heedlessness or recklessness before a recovery can be had.
Last Clear Chance-The Court finally called a spade a spade
in Miller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co.1s acknowledging that
the Court had been playing with words when it had previously
stated that the doctrine of last clear chance did not apply in
this State. 19
Knowledge as Affecting Negligence-In the case of Coffee
v. Anderson County,20 the Court restated the proposition that
one who uses a highway even though he knows of a defect in
it, or a danger near it, is not guilty of negligence in doing
so, unless the defect is of such a nature or the danger so
obvious that a person of ordinary prudence would not have
used it.
III
Damages
Trespass- Punitive Damages -

The Court held that puni-

tive damages are awarded not only as punishment for a wrong,
but also as vindiction of a private right, and when under
proper allegations a plaintiff proves a wilful, wanton, reckless, or malicious violation of his rights it is not only the
right but the duty of the jury to award punitive damages in

the case of Davenport v. Woodside Cotton Mills Co.21 where

the evidence indicated that defendant dumped poisonous waste
on plaintiff's land after it had notice that the substance was
killing plaintiff's hogs.
Contract- Punitive Damages -

Darlington,22

of
proposition that
wilful or wanton
fraud is alleged.

In Collopy v. Citizens Bank

the Court had occasion to re-examine the
punitive damages can be properly given for
injury arising out of contract even though no
Citing Winthrop v. Allen,23 it was said that

16. CODE OF LAWS OF SouTH

CAROLINA,

1952 § 46-801.

17. 224 S.C. 162, 77 S.E. 2d 803 (1953).
18. 81 S.E. 2d 355 (S.C. 1954).
19. See 1 S.C.L.Q. 70 (1948) and 4 S.C.L.Q. 179 (1951) for notes on
the doctrine in South Carolina.
20. 225 S.C. 477, 80 S.E. 2d 51 (1954).
21. 225 S.C. 52,80 S.E. 2d 740 (1954).

22. 223 S.C. 493, 77 S.E. 2d 215 (1953).
23. 116 S.C. 388, 108 S.E. 153, 154 (1921).
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a mere wilful violation of a contract does not create a tort,
but if such is a wilful invasion accompanied by a purpose of
financial self benefit, a tort will have been committed and the
injured party may elect which form of action he will pursue.
Default Judgment - Punitive Damages - In the case of
Patrickv. Wolowek, 24 the Court pointed out the new procedure
available in obtaining punitive damages on default, brought
about by the amendment to the Code in 195325 which permits
a Judge of the Court of Common Pleas to render a judgment
by default of punitive damages in a tort action without aid of
a jury.
Mental Suffering as Element of - Where a portion of a
cemetery lot was sold to a stranger to the plaintiff who owned
such lot and burial therein of strangers was made, mental suffering or mental anguish suffered by the plaintiff as a result
thereof was held to be an element of actual damages. The
Court said in Lanford v. West Oakwood Cemetery,2 6 that it was
unnecessary to show wilfulness, wantonness or maliciousness
in order to recover for mental suffering or anguish which was
the natural and probable consequence of the wrong.

24. 81 S.E. 2d 717 (S.C. 1954).
25. 48 ST. AT LARGE, p. 137 (1953).
26. 223 S.C. 150, 75 S.E. 2d 865 (1953).
for case note on subject.
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